Abstract Habermas suggests that democracy means that a society is able to know itself and steer itself. This article builds on Habermas' conception that mediatization is a central impediment to the realization of democracy, while recognizing the locally particular resolution of democratic dilemmas represented by any planning system. Using Victoria, Australia as an example, the article seeks to demonstrate that Habermas' project offers a means of critiquing existing planning systems. Rather than communicative planning remaining an unattainable ideal, the possibility is explored of Habermasian critique offering practical directions for enhancing the democracy of existing planning systems.
Introduction
This article offers a critique of planning viewed as an aspect of democratic governance. It draws directly upon Habermas' insight into the way policy is influenced by 'steering media' (for instance, law, bureaucracy, money) that act to restrict normative input, to help explain the absence of 'communicative planning' in our case study. The approach taken in this article is unashamedly procedural -it is premised upon the idea that it is possible to understand the realities of planning practice in different places at least partly by reference to the procedures used to plan. Our subject is the planning system of the State of Victoria, Australia, focusing upon the institutions whereby local planning schemes, including state and local policy dimensions, are prepared and implemented. These 'chronically repeated acts' of plan-making and implementation constitute a significant part of the institutional apparatus through which society understands itself, defines problems and collectively acts on them (Giddens, 1984: 376) . While metropolitan plans are occasionally prepared by the Victorian state government, it is the institutional practices of plan-making and implementation at local government level that have enduring influence in shaping urban development on the ground (see McLoughlin, 1992) .
Democratic governance contains a complex and intersecting mixture of normative precepts. For example: inclusive participation, decisive and effective government, representation of the public interest, protection of human rights, equality, and liberty to produce and consume. These are all desirable features of democratic governance, yet they pull in different directions. Hence democracy is characterized by antinomy -it is not possible for perfectly inclusive governance to be both rapidly decisive and representative; perfect market liberty is not possible while protecting equality; rights to a healthy environment conflict with unfettered rights to own and use land -and so forth. In critiquing a particular context of democratic governance we are not simply faced with identifying what is good and bad, but identifying what is good and bad about a particular balance of 'goods'. 1 This balance is institutionalized in locally particular laws and organizational structures of governance. This article, while recognizing the importance of material realities, suggests that the realities of procedures play a role in substantive outcomes. The article seeks to provide a framework to understand the procedural barriers to democratic planning, and suggests that this framework can also provide a starting point to consider material realities as they relate to governance.
Our critique begins by analysing the Victorian planning system in terms of pairs of opposing desiderata as dilemmas of democracy. These patterns do not represent some unmediated reality. Rather, they are the result of the human social activity of knowing and acting collectively. Of course, other patterns than those we draw attention to here can be found in the kaleidoscope of democracy, as can other dilemmas. We then critically comment on the planning system, employing Habermas' interpretive categories of 'facts', 'norms', knowing', 'steering' and 'mediatization' to inquire whether its overall balance could become more democratic, and if so, how. Finally, we draw some conclusions for reform of the Victorian planning system with a view to its further democratization.
Planning and democratic dilemmas
Jürgen Habermas has made a life's work of beating a path through the thicket of problems surrounding democracy. His project is to preserve the possibility of collective action, while diminishing the impact of unequal power relations on public policy (Habermas, 1987 (Habermas, : 374-403, 1962 (Habermas, /1989 (Habermas, , 1996 . With reference to Habermas' work, urban planning scholars have described the 'communicative turn' (Healey, 1996) , or 'the argumentative turn' (Fischer and Forester, 1993) in planning theory. Forester applied critical theory, drawing attention to the discursive and political nature of practice (Forester, 1985 (Forester, , 1989 ). Healey and Innes have used Habermas' ideas to develop insights into the communicative implications of plans, showing that participation without communicative ethics provides opportunities for unequal power relations to be inscribed in policy and decisions (Healey, 1993; Healey and Hillier, 1995; Innes, 1996) . More recently, Healey and others have developed institutional critiques of relations between state and civil society, probing the dilemmas of participation and democracy (Healey, 1996 (Healey, , 1997 (Healey, , 1999b Hillier, 2000; Innes and Booher, 1999; Vigar et al., 2000) .
As a key inspiration for the communicative turn in planning, Habermas' brand of democracy is contested. Flyvbjerg, for instance, is critical of Habermas' allegedly foundationalist and constitutionalist tendencies, but ultimately concludes that, 'perhaps the polarity "relativism-foundationalism" is just another artificial dualism that makes it easy to think, but hard to understand' (Flyvbjerg, 2001) . Our point, which we develop in the first part of this article, is that there is often some truth or virtue to be found on both sides of a bipolar construct. It is not the bipolarity which is indicative of sloppy thinking (see Kelly, 1955) but rather the tendency to privilege one pole and discount or marginalize the other, a tendency that the logician and environmentalist Plumwood (Plumwood, 2002: 97) now describes as 'centrism'. Habermas, while recognizing substantive and material difference, focuses on procedural understandings of democracy, seeking to find ways in which the universal and uniform tendencies of modern government can deal with liberty versus equality, or unity versus diversity, or the rights of majorities alongside minorities (Habermas, 1999) . Some commentators question the value of Habermas' deliberative democracy in terms of its incomplete understanding of justice, particularly in substantive terms (Cohen, 1997; Femia, 1996) . Others consider it Eurocentric, based on mythical ideals of life-worlds and speech acts (Kaufman, 1999) ; that it cannot account for the inherent subjectivity of individuals (Freundlieb, 2000) ; that the basis of Habermas' idea of democracy in an ideal speech act is misguided (Cooren, 2000) ; as is the failure to account for economic scarcity (Avio, 2000) . Some suggest that as a 'cure', Habermas' deliberative democracy is worse than the 'disease', due to its ultimate deference to liberal ideals (Maffetone, 2000) . Some, more sympathetic to Habermas, suggest that his project requires more work to provide answers for procedural democracy (Black, 2000; Chernilo, 2002) .
Defending Habermas against the range of criticisms outlined above is beyond the scope of this article. However, we contend that, within liberal systems of urban planning governance, Habermas' approach can offer significant insights into procedural impediments to democracy. Habermas' point is that the compromise achieved by liberal democracy is insufficient to provide a deliberative arena in which everyone has the opportunity to participate. The creation of such an arena is, as Plumwood (2002: 92-6) argues, essential for the 'bad news from below' (such as environmental damage) to filter through to the level where state power is exercised. But the quality of process cannot be the only measure of its success. Habermas, whose project is human emancipation, would agree with Plumwood when she writes: 'If a process of political communication is working well, if it is inclusive and open in a real and not just formal way to all, it should be articulating the needs of all communicants and thus producing a certain kind of distributive product. That product is substantive social and distributive equality' (Plumwood, 2002: 95, emphasis in original) . The quality of the process must in part be judged by the outcome. That said, however, there are substantial barriers standing in the way of an effective democratic process which we describe in the second part of this article.
Urban regions, including Victoria, are subject to far-reaching structural forces. Globalization is increasingly recognized as influencing the fortunes of urban regions and the relations among people within them (Graham and Marvin, 2001; Hall, 2001; Thornley and Rydin, 2002) . Economic forces and regimes, both global and local, act upon regions in distinct ways, influencing politics and modes of capital accumulation (Lauria, 1997) . Ethnic, cultural, and identity struggles are played out in urban areas and result in particular outcomes favouring some and disadvantaging others (Fincher and Jacobs, 1998; Sandercock and Kliger, 1998; Wallace and Milroy, 1999; Yiftachel and Avinoam, 1998; Young, 1990) . Cities represent places where difference and disadvantage are unevenly represented in space, yet economic forces apparently discriminate against the potential for governmental intervention to prevent this (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2002) . Referring to these kinds of urban realities, Yiftachel echoes a long-standing debate by arguing that many contemporary planning theorists, especially communicative ones, privilege process over substance (Yiftachel, 2001: 6) . Others criticize the inability of communicative planning to live up to its ideals or to demonstrate the benefits of communicative approaches (Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger, 1998) . This article takes a step towards redressing these problems, by providing a direct critical connection between a Habermasian approach and the institutional frameworks in which plans are made and implemented. To make this connection, the article first poses the question of how the irreducible dilemmas of liberal democracy are resolved in planning, using the Victorian case as an example. While space limitations do not allow expression of more than a basic framework here, it is contended that these democratic dilemmas can provide a starting point for characterizing and understanding substantive urban matters within the framework of procedural democracy. Similarly, the possibility for a Habermasian approach to offer insights into resolving these dilemmas in a more democratic manner, explored in the second half of the article, provides a theoretical starting point for examination of the role of institutions in influencing substantive urban realities.
To begin, one must start with the recognition that planning need not be democratic. Urban plans can be prepared and implemented by elites, ignoring the public. Likewise, a highly inclusive democracy need not engage in planning. But there are advantages of both democracy and planninghence democratic planning -which we will not rehearse here in depth. Briefly though, democracy embodies the principle of autonomy, 2 yet in drawing deeply from the pool of public knowledge, goes beyond the individual to the good of society. Planning embodies long-term and system-wide thinking and (ideally) expresses the collective aspirations of citizens for the future of urban areas. Some outcomes (for example integrated transport, equitable distribution, ecological rationality, socially fair housing policy responsive to cultural diversity) only become possible with planning.
Any planning system can be considered according to its value as a democratic process by which citizens individually and collectively seek future outcomes. From a Habermasian perspective, one may question to what degree the people 'rule themselves'. However, in posing this question, one immediately confronts the dilemmas of democracy. Particular institutions, having emerged from different cultural contexts, insofar as they can be called democratic, embody locally particular resolutions of these dilemmas.
In Victoria, urban planning, as set out in the Planning and Environment Act (1987) and associated regulation is undertaken by the Minister for Planning via the State-level Department of Infrastructure (DoI) (Planning and Environment Act, 1987: 446) . Local authorities are charged with preparing and administering planning schemes (Planning and Environment Act, 1987: Sections 9, 13) , under the ultimate jurisdiction of the Minister, DoI and the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) (Planning and Environment Act, 1987: Sections 35, 77-82) . VCAT is a body charged with reviewing the procedures and decisions of plan implementation by local authorities (VCAT Act, 1998: Part 16) . The following sections examine the way in which four dilemmas of democracy are resolved in Victoria's planning system. These dilemmas were chosen due to their enduring centrality in liberal-democratic forms of government (Dahl, 1982) , which exists as a backdrop to many western planning systems.
Inclusiveness versus decisiveness
Democracy requires the inclusion of all citizens in decision-making. However, decision-making, to be effective, requires closure within a limited period, suggesting limits to inclusion. So, some balance between inclusiveness and decisiveness is required (Dahl, 1982: 190; Low, 1991: 274) . Modern democracies deal with this dilemma via: representative government, ministerial responsibility, 'cabinet' committees, bureaucracy, executives, and jurisdictional boundaries. Of course, factors such as distribution of wealth, class, gender, and culture also determine who participates, and how.
Although casual observation might suggest otherwise, Victoria's planning system operates at the decisive end of the spectrum. While relatively high levels of inclusion are allowed in plan implementation and review processes, this is negated by limits to inclusion designed to facilitate quick(er) decisions. 3 Citizens are typically involved in planning at the 'implementation' stage, when they oppose proposals for development. This involvement often consumes considerable resources, particularly in wealthier areas, causing developers to complain about inadequate decisiveness and sluggish decision-making. These disputes during implementation are commonly resolved at the VCAT, where developers engage the services of highly-paid lawyers and consultants, overwhelming resident opposition typically undertaken on a 'do it yourself' basis. In response, middle-class action groups such as Save Our Suburbs seek to draw on the expertise of their members to fight cases and to develop citizen expertise in planning matters (Lewis, 1999) . It should be noted that whilst the capacity to engage in such struggles is to some extent determined by wealth this does not make participation itself a 'middle-class' activity.
Making sense of these ongoing conflicts requires consideration that prior to implementation, citizens have little meaningful involvement in planmaking. Plan-making in Victoria, known as the 'scheme amendment process', 4 can be characterized in terms of eight main stages, codified in Part 3 of the Planning and Environment Act (1987):
1. Initiation and decision to commence scheme amendment by local authority.
Preparation of documentation.
3. Exhibition of documentation and opportunity for public submissions.
4. Expert Panel hearing, allowing submissions. Throughout plan-making, restrictions upon inclusion exist to allow decisiveness. First, citizen involvement is permitted only insofar as it relates to a narrow, predetermined definition of 'planning matters' outlined in the standardized planning scheme blueprint, the Victorian Planning Provisions (VPPs). 5 Second, plan-making at local authority and panel level requires acceptance of many 'givens' into which few citizens have had prior input. 6 Third, at each stage of plan-making, decisions are made with little or no potential for citizen influence over outcomes: decisions to commence and proceed are made by the local authority (Council); the recommendations are made by the planning department or an independent panel. Finally, regardless of any participation, the planning control must be endorsed by the Minister, who makes any changes deemed appropriate (Planning and Environment Act, 1987: 35) . These limits upon inclusion ensure a certain degree of decisiveness in plan-production, despite codified citizen participation.
In plan-implementation (development control) all but minor effects of formal participation processes required by the Act are negated. Participation is permitted at three main stages:
1. 'Objections' may be lodged by parties 'potentially affected' by planning applications (Planning and Environment Act, 1987: s57) .
2. Objectors may lobby Councillors and speak at Council meetings.
3. Objectors may lodge an application for review (appeal) against a decision of Council and subsequently appear at the VCAT hearing (Planning and Environment Act, 1987: ss77-84) .
The effect of these public inputs is limited. Only 'planning matters' in objections may be considered by planners -assessment criteria already set out by the planning scheme. A large number of uses and developments do not require applications, or are simply prohibited -excluding public consideration in the first instance. Depending on the application, councillors or planners make the final decision on whether a permit is issued. A relatively high number of applications are reviewed by VCAT, resulting from disputes at local level. The VCAT is highly exclusive -only planning scheme matters may be discussed, and determinations are made by the sitting member(s) alone. Accordingly, significant limits to inclusion exist in the interests of decisiveness in plan-making and implementation. Final ministerial control ensures that planning schemes are adopted, despite any disagreements, in accordance with central rationales. Implementation processes are ostensibly inclusive, allowing citizen input into the process, yet codified procedures ensure ongoing compliance with the planning scheme because final decision-making powers are retained by planners and the VCAT.
Centralization versus localization
How the 'public interest' can best find expression remains an enduring puzzle (Dahl, 1982; Fagence, 1977; Healey, 1997: 296-7; Held, 1987: 268-83; Howe, 1994; Meyerson and Banfield, 1955; Mill, 1861 Mill, /1948 . More extreme neo-liberal views hold that society is simply an aggregate of individuals, the only entities that can have interests (Friedman, 1962; Hayek, 1944 Hayek, : 62, 1960 . Some authority is still required to create and maintain the body of rules governing 'the market', so that individuals can interact productively. However, the market is plainly a social artefact and there is a public interest in making it work. This public interest finds expression in a strong and sometimes authoritarian central state (Gamble, 1994; Held, 1995) but neo-liberal theory sees no necessity for any other expression of interest between the individual and the state.
In contrast, pluralists regard social groups as the basic political entity (Dahl, 1956; Truman, 1951) . While many groups have no particular spatial affinity, most pluralists and even some neo-liberals (Hayek, 1960) acknowledge that social interests are associated with place (locus) -especially place of residence (Mill, 1863 (Mill, /1962 . This recognizes that, almost universally, local government exists in some form and persists. The question is how decisionmaking power should be allocated between the levels of central and local government.
There are advantages both in concentrating power centrally, and dispersing it among localities. On the one hand, centralized power enables effective planning for large-scale systems such as city-wide markets, integrated transport, water catchments and ecosystems. A central state might guarantee equality of government services (for example public education, health and housing). On the other hand, local power allows greater democratic depth, permitting diverse place-based solutions, best demonstrated in the principle of subsidiarity on which European Union governance is based. It states that: 'subsidiarity is . . . the notion that the lowest level of government that can efficiently perform a function is the right one to do so' (CEPR, 1993 (CEPR, , 2002 . 7 In Australia, the initiative for urban development is decentralized and largely in the hands of individuals and private developers. State bodies, such as the Urban and Regional Land Corporation of Victoria (URLC) do exist, but operate largely on the basis of market principles, separately from 'planning' agencies. In contrast, the planning system of Victoria is quite centralized at the level of the State. Plan-making and implementation are ostensibly devolved to local government, but many factors restrict local autonomy. In plan-making, local authorities must follow the stategovernment prepared Victorian Planning Provisions (VPPs). 8 Policies such as ResCode, the residential design guide, are subsumed under planning schemes (Clauses 54-56 of the VPPs), and are not open to significant modification at the local level. 9 These requirements are enforced by the process of plan adoption, which requires Ministerial approval for the scheme to have force (Planning and Environment Act, 1987: s35) .
Local authorities undertake implementation using planning schemes, according to statewide rules and practices set out in the Planning and Environment Act (1987) . Centre-local tensions are manifest in the discretionary 'space' allowed to Councils in deciding applications. Within their discretionary scope, Councils commonly determine in favour of local sentiment. In contrast, the many VCAT hearings are typically determined in accordance with State objectives in the centrally directed elements of the planning scheme. Central control is exercised both before and after the fact of a development application: by imposing the rules used by local government to decide; and at VCAT, ensuring that those rules and policies have been followed.
Rights versus utility
Human rights and utility are cornerstones of democracy. As precepts, however, they conflict. Modern democratic ideals are based on extending and maintaining basic rights, such as those in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man. However, rights are difficult to determine since they must be socially constructed -they have no individual fundamental basis.
Bentham, the inventor of utilitarianism, regarded rights as 'simple nonsense' and 'natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsensenonsense upon stilts' (Bentham, 1789 (Bentham, /1961 . Utility measures the worth of a system of governance against its contributions to overall human well-being or satisfaction: product rather than process. 10 In utilitarianism -the basis of modern economics -the satisfactions of one individual may be traded off against another's; what matters is total satisfaction. In economics this is measured in dollars, supporting market outcomes (Friedman, 1962; Hayek, 1960) . As one might expect, there are advantages to both utilitarian and rights-based concepts, and in practice they co-exist as conflicting legitimations of democratic government. Rights recognize the individual (McCloskey, 1984: 121-36; Mackie, 1984: 86-90; Sumner, 1984: 20-7) . Utility gives priority to the public interest. However, as rights are favoured, the criterion of utility is eroded (Dahl, 1982: 96-7) .
In Victoria, the planning system extends rights only insofar as they relate to property, combined with basic rights of participation. Maintenance of other human rights is left to mechanisms such as the fiscal and welfare system. Taking this as given, it is still evident that within the scope of Victorian planning, utility is favoured over rights. There is considerable emphasis in the state policy section of all planning schemes towards wider goals such as facilitation of development and encouragement of economic growth, ostensible urban consolidation goals, and achievement of 'net community benefit' (VPP: cc11-19). These policies are implicit in all subordinate regulations, zones or 'tests' applied to development proposals such as the residential design control policy ResCode (VPP: cc54-6). Matters of individual right, for example, to meaningful participation, to autonomous use and enjoyment of land, or to a healthy, safe environment sustaining ecological integrity, are significantly curtailed by these overall goals. Various mechanisms offer some protection to these rights, such as testing the impacts of developments upon surrounding properties (e.g. ResCode), or formalized participation mechanisms (Planning and Environment Act, 1987: s57) However, in sum, these have limited strength over utility considerations and set only minimum standards of rights biased towards property (Planning and Environment Act, 1987: s60; Victorian Planning Provisions: c65). The essence of Victorian implementation is utilitarian -self-seeking individuals act en masse to achieve overall planning goals, requiring regulation only where this approach does not achieve overall benefits.
Equality versus liberty
The principle of equality has been established by constant struggle over two centuries, supporting universal suffrage, equal voting rights and 'equal opportunity'. It is the principle erected against all forms of discrimination by race, culture, gender, age or class; against the 'rotten borough' and the gerrymander. Equity determines that services provided by the state should be equally available to all.
In markets, people are at liberty to acquire, produce, consume and exchange, limited only by wealth. In the ideal of the market, people are treated unequally in one respect: money. Contrasted with each person in a democracy having the formal political power of just one vote, each person has the market power of how much currency they command. In practice, democratic states and markets combine elements of equality and liberty. Despite the hybrid nature of states and markets it is clear that state action of some kind is required to make people equal. However, allowing greater liberty via the market erodes the ability of the state to ensure equality. Accordingly, 'liberty and equality are in essence contradictory' (KuehneltLeddihn, 1952: 3) .
The Victorian planning system, with implementation based on regulating land use and development strongly favours liberty by making the market, rather than equality, the principal consideration in plan-making and implementation. It is true that in Australia most social justice matters are dealt with through the tax and welfare system. However, the overall presumption of Victorian planning is that 'if no good planning reason can be provided to stop a development, then it may go ahead', despite any implications for overall equality of service provision or urban form and function. The Act allows that social factors 'may' be considered (Planning and Environment Act, 1987: s60[1] [b]). However, this potential is overwhelmed by the presumption in favour of liberty and an absence of means by which equality might be considered. When the tests of an application's suitability, such as design, traffic impacts or floorspace are complied with, a permit must invariably be issued. 11 Clearly, even Victoria's reactive development control system could seek to redirect and manage growth to achieve equalizing goals. But at a fundamental level, no policy arenas or forums exist to realize distributional and environmental justice.
In summary, the planning system in Victoria is not very inclusive. Where public participation occurs it is late in the decision-making process, making for much conflict but allowing the public little real power. The system is geared to decisiveness, buoyed by complaints about delays caused by vocal but late and ineffective participation. The system is rather centralized with minimal real power being devolved to localities. It is oriented to utility more than to rights, and to liberty above equality. There are good reasons for the particular balances that have evolved. But is the system overall more or less democratic than it could and should be? To answer this question we turn more directly to Habermas.
Victorian planning and mediatization
Habermas contends that to be democratic, a society must be able both to 'know itself' and to 'steer itself' (Habermas, 1987 (Habermas, /1996 . This is arguably the raison d'être of modern planning. Mannheim, for example, posited that the 'rationality' of acts must be based on a true understanding of their implications -concluding that planning beyond the individual must occur (Mannheim, 1940: 9, 51-8) . To know itself a society must understand its challenges and the options available and aim to plan using rational, inclusive and empowering argument. To 'steer itself', moreover, a society must have the capacity to take action to deal with the challenges it faces in knowing itself. 'Capacity building' and 'fairly high levels of citizen activity' are key elements of the social learning necessary for effective environmental planning (Selman, 1999: 163) . The remaining part of this article outlines a framework for critiquing the particular resolution of democratic dilemmas represented by Victorian planning, using mediatization as a key principle.
Habermas considers 'mediatization' the central impediment to democratic knowing and steering, using the term in the scholarly footsteps of Marx, Parsons, and Weber. 12 Despite the constant debate, government increasingly relies on steering mechanisms based on the logics of instrumental reason, rather than on conscious collective deliberation (Habermas, 1987 (Habermas, : 187, 1987 (Habermas, /1996 . Instrumental reasoning leads to choices based upon achieving success in a given sphere (Audi, 1995: 674-5) . For example, money instrumentally coordinates action such that individuals act for economy or profit -the medium's success criteria. The medium of money tends to 'steer' society, as many individuals act according to the same logic, making similar decisions.
Habermas' project in some of his later work is the analysis of mediatization, or rather a return to the 'steering media' posited in his earlier work (Habermas, 1962 (Habermas, /1989 (Habermas, , 1984 (Habermas, , 1987 . However, he does not provide clear guidelines for the use of mediatization as a critical tool, leaving the work of operationalizing it unfinished (Chernilo, 2002) . Accordingly, it is to mediatization and its effects upon the way power shapes democracy that attention is focused in this article. Habermas' position on power commonly draws criticism on account of his idealized view of consensus (Fainstein, 2000: 461; Flyvbjerg, 1998a Flyvbjerg, , 1998b Hillier, 2000 Hillier, : 50, 2002 Phelps and TewdwrJones, 2000; Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger, 1998) . However, this misconstrues Habermas' position, in which consensus and communicative action are more properly seen as tools to 'open out' the uneven power relations in intersubjective processes of 'opinion and will formation' (Healey, 1999a (Healey, : 1131 .
If power is a social construct 'correspond[ing] to the human ability to not just act but to act in concert' (Arendt, 1969) , this directs attention to both individual agency, and the structures that shape and influence agency. Habermas' position on power is based upon intersubjectivity, seeing power as manifest in steering potential -individuals acting individually and collectively (Flyvbjerg, 2001; Habermas, 1984) . This suggests that structure (potentially open to modification, even transformation) influences the manner in which power, as persuasion and coercion, is manifest and that this modifies agency, creating an uneven landscape for action (Polanyi, 1958: 224) .
Seeing power as having performative and structural aspects, as well as occurring within public and tacit spheres, opens up the emancipatory potential of human action (Low, 1997) . It allows examination of the realities of power that lie within the structures of laws, institutions, languages or knowledges in the way that they influence people's ability to act in concert (Low, 1997: 90-3) . Habermas' concept of mediatization as impinging upon a society knowing and steering itself offers the potential to understand the power implications of particular structural formations, both public and tacit, for democratic planning. While communicative action and consensus are ideal (but unattainable) conceptions of equal power they can still be used to provide direction in modifying the structures of planning that establish power relations (McCarthy, 1978) .
In his early work, Habermas questioned the democratic value of the public sphere due to its mediatization according to mercantile values (Habermas, 1962 (Habermas, /1989 . In the Theory of Communicative Action he contends that sub-systems, such as the economy and the apparatuses of the state, mediatize public and private spheres (Habermas, 1984: 196, 318-23; 1987: Chapter 12) . Mediatization occurs when openly debatable and discourse-based mechanisms for knowing and steering in society are replaced with mechanisms based on instrumental logics that resist open processes of deliberation.
As the logics of media, such as law, bureaucracy, and economy are used in knowing and steering, a society's ability rationally to steer itself is diminished. For example, discourses within monetary systems measure 'rationality' according to economy or profit and restrict consideration to financial interests. Performative actions are allowed on the basis of dollars and understandings and practices develop around exchange, unevenly allocating the ability for persuasion and coercion. In contrast, 'rational' discourse would consider the individual interest within a wider moral and ethical framework that includes the interests and participation of others.
Between Facts and Norms (1996) focuses specifically upon the medium of law, accepting as inevitable that communicative means of governing are often replaced by media. The reasons for this are obvious -for example the time necessary for deliberative will-formation on all matters is simply not available, so law provides a stable basis for decisiveness. However, the 'facticity' of laws tends to over-ride 'norms'. Laws have facticity, in that they are socially accepted and thus become social facts providing a basis around which people form understandings and pursue interests. 'Norms' are communicatively constructed standards that could provide the communicatively rational basis for the acceptance of laws (Habermas, 1996: 29-30) . A law requires compliance (a fact -murderers are gaoled or hanged); it also claims legitimacy (via a norm -murder ought to be punished). There is often tension between facts and norms. This tension would dissolve if everybody accepted the moral basis of laws all the time, as would occur in the idealized realm of communicative action (Habermas, 1996: 8) . In practice, a law is often at odds with its claim for acceptance. Accordingly, if laws are the basis upon which society steers, they are often imperfectly aligned with norms, or the manner in which society knows itself.
Habermas distinguishes between the establishment of law according to the principle of 'universalization' (norms and laws are established on the basis of generally foreseeable circumstances) and 'discourses of justification'. Discourses of justification accept the need for each case to be understood on its own merits, where all circumstances cannot be anticipated ex ante (Habermas, 1996: 162) . This raises a second realm of concern regarding the facticity of law: the manner in which discretionary powers are exercised, and whether such powers can feed back into norms for the establishment and modification of existing laws.
In planning, it is not difficult to find examples where norms do not match the fact of law. In Victoria, incompatible land uses are separated by zoning -it is illegal to locate industry in a residential zone. However, the same zone allows a mental hospital, panel beater's shop or tavern. In these cases, the divergence between local norms and the fact of planning is commonly manifest in public disputes. The 'fact' of planning establishes uneven power relations between residents, the planning agency, the developer and the rest of the city. Yet the means of establishment and maintenance of these power relations remains hidden, suggesting that it is these tacit relationships (Low, 1997: 96-9) including the exercise of discretion that need examination.
While Habermas has explored only law in depth (Habermas, 1996) , and bureaucracy and economy to a lesser extent (Habermas, 1984: 65, 214 ), a range of other media exist (Habermas, 1987 (Habermas, /1996 . For example: a road-building bureaucracy constructs ever more roads to cope with traffic problems, when open debate might suggest other solutions; market principles encourage urban sprawl when inclusive debate might suggest different forms. Accordingly, the various media (law, bureaucracy, professionalism, markets) represent one pole of a dilemma: instrumental steering versus the deliberative formation of norms. Media both facilitate democracy by making it effective, but also restrict it, by preventing norm development and rational dialogue. Media distort the manner in which society knows and steers itself, not necessarily by excluding deliberation, but by restricting and modifying the form of knowing and steering (Habermas, 1987 (Habermas, /1996 . Ideally, media would be modified with societal expectations to match norms, but media impinge on the ongoing development of norms themselves -the process of 'colonisation' (Habermas, 1984: 185, 318-31, 355; .
Norms are the basis upon which necessary uneven power relations might be justified, admitting the inevitability and need for media in democratic governance and planning. Habermas' position does not simplistically seek to resolve democratic dilemmas according to communicative rationality. In order to match media and norms as closely as possible, Habermas suggests 'restraining barriers' to protect norm formation arenas from media, while sensitizing media to norms (Habermas, 1987 (Habermas, /1996 . 'Spaces' in governance are required where arguments do not have force simply by emanating from legal or bureaucratic origins, but from argument on the basis of ongoing justification.
Attention to steering media locates power relations centrally, viewing power as being interdependent activity based on individual and collective steering. When the 'best argument' yields to power (Flyvbjerg, 1998b: 36) , power has not 'mysteriously acted' (Forester, 2001 ). Rather, greater steering power has been allowed to certain parties, via the use of particular media in a planning complex. The question is then: is steering power matched by corresponding norms? For instance, few would dispute separating kindergartens and industry via statutory planning. However, in Victoria the same complex of planning allows the Minister to 'fast-track' scheme amendment processes (Planning and Environment Act, 1987; c20p4) , facilitating large-scale developments in the name of economic growth, despite public opposition. The intersubjective use of power by various parties to develop and use land calls into question the manner in which the various media are employed in a planning system. Specifically, 'does the planning system allow for the development of norms and then ensure they match the steering powers embodied in various media?'
Most governmental activity contains a combination of media, and urban planning is no exception. Money disperses steering and knowing to individual acts of land development, leaving government as a kind of umpire. Bureaucracy, used for steering, becomes a blunt tool reducing knowing to standardized categories and processes. Professionalism concentrates knowing, but typically steers only by aligning itself with money, bureaucracy, or law. Representational politics allows potential knowing via pluralistic politics, but confers steering capacity upon politicians and the executive, favouring certain dominant groups. Additionally, the competing logics of various media may further disrupt the potential for knowing and steering (Habermas, 1987 (Habermas, /1996 . Money, in dispersing steering to individuals undermines professional and bureaucratic steering capacities, explaining the seemingly irresistible force of global markets upon urban regions. Political logics commonly ignore or push aside professional or bureaucratic understandings. Legal logics commonly override political deliberations.
Insights offered by mediatization suggest that Habermas' project, while using consensus as an ideal, admits non-consensus, and even accommodates concepts such as 'agonistic respect' (see Hillier, 2002 : 120-4) within its wider framework. If the steering media more closely match norms, this represents a movement towards a practical, moral and ethical justification for acting without complete consensus (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996: 43) and with uneven power. It admits to practical concerns while suggesting directions for structural change. To demonstrate this, we now turn to the case study.
In Victoria, the day-to-day practices of local plan-making and implementation rely on media diffused through the entire planning complex. Examination of day-to-day plan-making and plan-implementation processes suggests that: law, professionalism, markets, bureaucracy and politics have steering capabilities in the planning complex. These media have particular cogency with regard to the dilemmas of democracy highlighted in this article, in that they are central to the functioning of liberal-democratic forms of governance. Importantly, the influence of different steering media was observed to have emphasis in different parts of the planning complex. This conception is used as a heuristic for understanding and critiquing the resolutions of wider dilemmas in Victorian planning as a form of democratic governance. The remainder of this article uses the case of Victoria to demonstrate a conception of planning as a mediatized means of knowing and steering. A broad conceptual framework for understanding is provided, rather than an exhaustive analysis of each medium, which is beyond the scope of the article.
Politics
Liberal politics, the contestation of ideas, interests and claims within institutional rules, is the most discursive of the media in Victorian planning. While it encourages discourse removed from communicative ideals, it does allow for varied voices to be heard and for some norm development to occur. However, politics in plan-making and implementation is generally limited to influencing Council meeting outcomes. 13 Elected Councils of local authorities meet, on a regular basis, to make planning decisions. Accordingly, norm development occurs through the processes of lobbying, local news coverage, mobilization of action groups and preparation of cases to put to Council. However, no equivalent political decision-making body exists at State level, where politics is limited to ministerial and executive decisions, backroom deal making typically with key business representatives, public relations 'spin' and posturing by interest groups and opposition parties. There is no metropolitan authority where wider issues of metropolitan planning might find a focus. The limited debate occurring in newspapers lacks a 'target', since planning ministers are distanced from political consequences by the bureaucracy of the Department of Sustainability and Environment and three-yearly elections that are rarely fought on planning issues. Accordingly, even while spatial inequity, social exclusion and environmental problems exist at a metropolitan level, the lack of a publicly accountable metropolitan body allows these issues to pass largely unnoticed. This lack of controversy and debate can allow a casual observer to conclude that a lack of interest indicates that 'all's well'. Overall, the presence of a deliberative forum only at local level allows little opportunity for norm development at state or metropolitan level.
Locally developed norms cannot be pushed 'upwards' to affect state planning since this is prevented by the threat of review by VCAT. Councils, using discretionary powers, commonly do not follow central planning policy, but respond to local norms. This divergence is typically overturned by VCAT, which disregards local sentiment, strictly adhering to 'planning policy' formulated by the State, and not heeding local opinion formation processes in decision-making. Further, its decision is simply 'passed down' to the local level, with no testing or deliberation about why 'the centre' must prevail over local sentiment. Local communities continually oppose 'inappropriate development' partly because they have not had the opportunity to participate in any wider debate. Because of their narrow focus, strategic orientation, and their situation within a centrally imposed system of planning, locally developed norms are unable to contribute to wider equity or rights considerations. In terms of knowing and steering, any potential role for politics is undermined by its localism.
Bureaucracy
The medium of bureaucracy is extensively used in formalized planning procedures. Implementation is reduced to testing of proposals against predetermined standards, categories and processes stipulated by the VPPs. Discourse is allowed only within the bureaucratically provided opportunities provided, including formal participation exercises such as 'objections ' (Planning and Environment Act, 1987: 446: s57 ) and submissions to the VCAT (Planning and Environment Act, 1987: 446: s84B) . Any public input not in line with 'planning matters' is ignored. Despite any public input exercises, plan-making is mainly directed to choosing among pre-given controls provided by the VPPs (P&EAct, 1987: 446: Part1A) . Accordingly, dissatisfaction with urban development is typically manifest in resident objections during implementation. Many concerns in these objections are ignored, as they do not relate to what are defined as 'planning matters'. Concerns regarding property devaluation, the 'quality' of future residents, neighbourhood character and various site-specific concerns, are typically ignored. Good reasons for limiting the rights of property owners over neighbouring development may exist, and these could be debated and principles decided at an earlier stage in plan making with a cross-section of the population represented. As it is, these matters are simply avoided without debate or explanation.
Bureaucratic logics constitute a severe impediment to norm development. In any situation, inclusion and 'success' require acceptance and use of bureaucratic logics. Wealthy residents, versed in the 'art' of the objection, use bureaucratic language and logics to achieve their goals. Couching their opposition in bureaucratic planning terms (streetscape, setbacks, density, design, etc.) to encourage refusal of marginal applications, their real concerns are property values or simple snobbishness. 14 Debate about the real issues is curtailed, such as whether neighbouring land values should be considered, whether existing well-serviced and attractive areas should be allowed to exclude newcomers, and whether urban density is a meaningful test of quality.
Bureaucracy represents a highly centralizing force, being standardized and imposed by the centre, with little potential for local adaptation, 15 at the direction of an effectively technocratic minister (P&EAct, 1987: 446: Part1A, s4C) . Despite occasional good intentions on the part of individual ministers, concentration of power in a single ministerial office with power over an executive and bureaucracy, with limited opportunity for political censure, encourages technocracy. This has led to repeated imposition of central bureaucratic logic upon localities, imposing particular tradeoffs of political desiderata, with no scope for discussion of these tradeoffs. The favouring of utilitarian and libertarian ideals thus entailed further reduces the potential for steering and knowing above the level of the individual.
Law
Law as a steering medium provides 'force' to planning. In Victoria, contentious matters are routinely resolved in VCAT using legalistic and professional interpretation of existing plans and precedent. Constant repetition of this quasi-legal dispute resolution mechanism resists reappraisal of the 'facts' underlying planning. VCAT plays no role in setting policy or in establishing planning controls. Precedent setting occurs according to legal or professional logics, again overriding norms. The legal and non-political role of VCAT requires that planning schemes alone are used for assessment of applications, causing the 'facticity' of VCAT to diverge from norms. Little potential exists for VCAT to be sensitive to norms because it has no link with plan-production, excepting the continuous strong downward force of tribunal decisions upon the localities.
Legally allowed inclusion in VCAT is ostensibly on the principles of natural justice, allowing lay-people and lay-languages (VCAT Act, 1998:
Residents opposing development in their neighbourhood commonly present cases. However, only those matters already in the planning scheme may legally be debated -an exclusive, centralizing effect. Residents questioning the merits of urban consolidation for example, which is implicit throughout the Victorian Planning Provisions, get short shrift. They must choose between arguing honestly with little chance of success, and acting strategically to discover 'planning reasons', unrelated to their real concerns, which offer potential success.
The encouragement of strategic behaviour in VCAT reinforces a converse discouragement of norm development. This favours liberty and utility, as rights and equality require ongoing construction and development in the public realm. However, the legislation and planning schemes contain predetermined measures of rights. For example, rights to privacy in backyards are protected: no window within nine horizontal metres may overlook a yard (VPPs: c55.04-6). Residents are astounded that a window 10 m away is then considered acceptable. VCAT decisively and continuously reimposes these centrally predetermined facts on to the local without regard for local norms. The disparity between expectations and legal facticity in the nine metre rule provides a 'stopping point' for privacy, so that development can occur -a utilitarian rationale. Yet the mediative nature of law does not allow it to respond to the 'gap' between facticity and normative, societal expectations.
Money
Money is a fourth steering medium. Since actual urban processes are shaped both by private interests and public collective interests we suggest they should be considered together from a democratic viewpoint. The presumption of planning in Victoria is that individuals, acting upon narrow utilitarian self-interest, are the driving force of urban development. Lodgement of applications, the purchase of expertise, and choices of development type are initiated by private interests.
Divergence between market logics (with money as its index) and norms is easily discerned in Victorian planning. For example, compare opinions and motivations between residents and developers in inner city areas: residents seek maintenance of amenity and neighbourhood character; developers seek financial returns. At regional level, the market logic can still be discerned: low density at the outskirts meeting demand for cheap housing; and medium density inner-city redevelopment meeting demand for quality housing near employment, commercial facilities and quality schools. Yet no means exist for developing corresponding public norms to consider the implications of this. The predetermined formulations of the planning scheme allow the imposition of the market over norms. Utility is favoured on the basis that overall societal benefits (economic growth) will accrue only if minimal regulation occurs. Similarly, liberty expressed via aggregate individual desires, disallows equity considerations in the distribution and use of resources throughout the metropolis of Melbourne.
The market excludes those without the ability to pay (to do something on a piece of land), while dispersing steering so that the potential for deliberative exercise of social choice is reduced. As a medium, the market reduces knowing to individual assessments of financial returns, allowing ignorance of wider social or environmental impacts. The ubiquitous market medium in Victorian planning prevents norm development.
Professionalism
Professionalism provides a base of acceptable practices and values for planners, requiring conformance (separately from politics) within the parameters of bureaucracy and law. Professional inclusion and advancement for planners depend on qualifications and experience, but importantly upon shared values. This highly non-reflexive trait encourages imposition of the medium of professionalism and discourages sensitivity to societal norms.
Planning professionalism is strongly affiliated with other media, typically bureaucracy (government planners), law (expert witnesses, Tribunal members) and the market (consultants). This is exemplified in disputes where various planners take opposing positions according to affiliation, particularly at VCAT. While a case might be made that this exposes all of the arguments, allowing the tribunal to make the 'best' decision, it highlights the fickle nature of professional opinion. Importantly, professionalism is respectively centralized, localized or dispersed according to the affiliation of the individual (e.g. law and bureaucracy are centralized, money is dispersed, etc.). This undermines the potential for professionalism to play a role in democratic knowing and steering. Planning professionalism in Victoria pays little heed to democratic concerns, particularly equity and rights, since professional success depends upon alignment with media, rather than core democratic values.
Significant elements of the Victorian planning system, particularly state policy, are embodied in a form that disallows recognition of actual choices made. Decisions affecting the equality of distribution, modal split between public and private transport, urban containment or sprawl, and the measurement of ecological footprint are obscured. We contend that obscuration is intimately entwined with mediatization both as cause and effect (e.g. for discussion on the 'black box' see Latour, 1987) . Obscuration allows non-communicative logics to steer, corresponding to a lack of knowing. At the scale of the city-region, reliance upon money logics to steer and know does not permit understandings of the non-market implications of city growth. Norms have little chance of being developed, as there are no public forums in which understandings could be debated or social resistance expressed. This planning system is thus highly exclusive, denying opportunities to develop new norms.
Conclusions and recommendations
Drawing this analysis of Victorian planning together leads first to insights inspired by Habermas, and second, to practical changes suggested for Victoria. In terms of Habermas' theorizing, the analysis indicates the following broad conclusions:
1. Particular media in a planning system have varying impacts upon norm development and upon a society's capacity for knowing and steering itself.
2. The use and 'location' of particular media in the overall planning system have a discernable impact on the way the other dilemmas of democracy are resolved, and upon the impacts of any particular medium upon knowing and steering.
3. The arrangement and use of media, in conjunction with other dilemmas, need to be considered in setting a foundation for democratic and communicative planning.
These conclusions suggest that the theoretical framework, if applied to particular substantive circumstances, can provide procedural explanations for particular material conditions. Additionally, at a broader conceptual level, they suggest change to the Victorian case as starting principles for a more democratic planning system. Most fundamentally, Victorian planning must heed its primary role as a form of governance, and seek to democratize itself. Current planning strongly favours liberty and utility, within a centrally enforced and exclusive framework, reducing the scope for democracy. Citizens have limited potential to develop norms through contact with the day-to-day practices of planning, leading to a culture of apathy, along with self-seeking or oppositional behaviours that undermine democratic values. The challenge, then, is to develop a suitable mix of local and central control, societally agreedupon tradeoffs between rights and utility, liberty and equity, and inclusive forums that maintain the capacity for decisiveness. Provided a decision rule is first agreed upon, there is no reason why deliberative forums cannot be decisive.
The limited role of politics in Victorian planning reduces its (albeit imperfect) potential to assist overall knowing and steering. At the local level, a clearly delineated role for politics must be defined, within which local discretion cannot be overturned by higher authority. There is in fact a strong case for giving local authorities a 'general power' and including the local level in a future Australian constitution. If matters of purely local concern are dealt with at this level, local norms will develop and more closely match both local plans and decisions.
Above the local level, political arenas must be developed to counter the depoliticizing effect of the current 'executive control' model. These arenas, dealing with matters of regional and state concern, need to be receptive to local input, yet be decisive, going beyond simple aggregations of local interests and allowing regional norms to develop. This would enhance the capacity of the public to know and steer in matters beyond self or local interest, sensitizing the centre (State level) and the local to each other. Importantly, clearly delineated political arenas still allow for decisiveness, yet also allow for relatively higher levels of inclusion than other media. While other examples exist, the Netherlands provides a relatively clear demonstration of the possibility for norm development occurring via established forums at local, provincial and national level, allowing wider knowledge development in parallel with decision-making. Most visible of these is the VROM Council as an independent council advising national government, or the provincial spatial planning committees (Van der Heiden et al., 1992: 121) . While the interdependence of the Dutch model must be taken into account when making comparisons with Victoria, it is clear that current legalistic mechanisms for imposing the central upon the local, namely VCAT and the VPPs, require modification to admit other forms of knowledge. If VCAT's role were restricted to defects of procedure, leaving questions of discretion to be left to more reflexive, political and professional bodies, ongoing norm development over the entire hierarchy of planning could begin to occur.
The use of central bureaucratic logic, which restricts norm development, needs modification. Within a defined scope allowed for local discretion, municipalities must be allowed to prepare controls to achieve locally determined goals, allowing greater local norm development, rather than centrally-imposed mechanisms. Local implementation is then more likely to match local norms. The requirement that local participation occurs according to pre-set procedures favours certain media, tending to privilege bureaucratic logics, and should be adapted to local circumstances, within broad centrally set parameters.
At higher tiers of planning, bureaucratic approaches remain appropriate, as they offer the potential for fair application of policy across many local areas, if these are matters that cannot be dealt with by municipalities. However, bureaucratic procedures and criteria must be developed and used by a body that is both sensitive to local norms, yet able to impose these decisively and fairly. While the content and application of higher level plans will remain contested, a combination of political, bureaucratic, executive and professional media is required in a form that encourages plans more closely to match societal norms.
Many practices currently obscure from view the actual choices made in Victorian planning. Legal and bureaucratic bases of current planning schemes, on the one hand imply that 'if it is not illegal, then it is appropriate'; while on the other, they require the exercise of considerable discretion by local authorities, on the basis of 'rules' that are centrally designed and enforced. This leads to a significant number of individual choices being made, with no corresponding ability to heed the cumulative effects of these choices. This corresponds with the individualizing logics of the market, an unavoidable characteristic of Victorian planning. Accordingly, the effects of dispersed individual choices need to be brought into public view as a first step in knowing, and accordingly, steering. Choices between rights and utility, and liberty and equity, must be made apparent and publicly justified at each level of planning. Matters such as environmental and intergenerational values, curtailment of individual land ownership rights, equitable distribution of facilities and opportunity, and investment choices in transportation infrastructure must be understood at local, regional and state scales, in accordance with the principles of subsidiarity. 17 This would be undertaken in parallel with the creation of appropriate discursive forums.
A final question remains regarding the role of the professional planner. Professional values in Victoria are aligned with bureaucratic, legal or market logics. Planners must break from this alignment to facilitate planning as a democratic instrument, assisting Victoria as a people to know itself and steer itself. Various technical, legal, design, bureaucratic, and communication skills of planners, can still be drawn in and directed towards democracy. In doing this, planners must work towards resolving the dilemmas of democracy without simple recourse to existing power structures. Working within the current formulation simply perpetuates essentially undemocratic planning. Planners must be prepared to look beyond the current roles offered by the logics of non-democratic media.
Public participation can improve the democracy of the planning system but pasting 'participation' exercises on to a highly mediatized system will simply lead to frustration all round. The structural inadequacies of the system have first to be addressed and participation introduced in such a way as to create a fair and equal process that will lead to fair and equal outcomes. A structural form of governance has to be created which will allow problems arising at the grass roots level to be communicated to those with the authority to act on them collectively using the power vested in the state.
Notes
1. We avoid the term 'equilibrium' because there is no suggestion that any particular balance struck is equally weighted between opposing poles. In any particular structural member, to borrow a term from engineering, there is always a 'bending moment' -a tendency for the member, if unchecked, to turn in a particular direction under the force of gravity.
2. The principle of autonomy is one of the central tenets of Enlightenment thought: 'Persons should enjoy equal rights and, accordingly, equal obligations in the specification of the political framework which generates and limits the opportunities available to them; that is, they should be free and equal in the determination of the conditions of their own lives, so long as they do not deploy this framework to negate the rights of others' (Held, 1995: 147) .
3. In the Victorian planning system, implementation is undertaken via statutory planning. This is effectively development control, the testing of planning applications for conformance with predetermined criteria in texts and maps. Importantly, this contains scope for the exercise of discretion by decisionmaking bodies in determining neighbourhood character, streetscape impacts, compliance with policy, etc.
4. Because the whole State is now covered by planning schemes (sets of policies), any ongoing plan-making activity means changing or 'amending' these schemes.
5. Any party may make submissions to a proposed amendment to a planning scheme (which might include introduction of an entire new scheme). If submissions are made, an independent Panel is appointed allowing parties to make further submissions and to consider these in making a recommendation to the Minister (P&EAct, 1987: 446: ss21-4).
6. The most fundamental of the 'givens' is the Victoria Planning Provisions (VPPs). The VPPs are a blueprint planning scheme used across the state containing pre-given policies, zones, overlays, decision criteria, definitions of land use and a range of other matters. While some components may be tailored to suit individual authorities, these are limited in scope and effect.
7. Continental Europe has traditionally accorded more autonomy to local government than Britain and its colonies. Europe has of necessity had to adopt a pluralist attitude to its diverse cultures even while imposing a centralized vision of a European market.
8. It is noted that the VPP format allows for a Local Policy and Planning Framework (LPPF). However, the impact of this is reduced by two factors: its form and content are limited by the requirement that it not contradict the remainder of the 'given' scheme; and the greater weight allowed the 'core' statutory components, other than the LPPF.
9. Exceptions can be found, such as modification to the amount of private open space required of dwellings. However, these must be considered as minor in comparison to the plethora of other controls.
10. Classical utilitarians, such as Jeremy Bentham, remove the individual from primary consideration and replace them with the overall calculus of pleasure or pain -hedonism is a society's guiding force (Bentham, 1789 (Bentham, /1961b .
11. 'Planning reasons' are effectively those dealt with in the VPP-format planning schemes, which do not make reference to equity considerations. Section 4(2)(c) of the Planning & Environment Act (1987) makes fleeting reference to 'integration' of planning with inter alia 'social policies', but makes no other reference nor does it provide decision criteria for assessment of this.
12. While emanating from the same origins, this use is more specific than Mannheim's, whose principia media (the main understandings of an age), together act as the structure under which individuals collectively act (Mannheim, 1940) . It could be said, however, that Habermas' normative goals for 'steering and knowing' represent considerable convergence with Mannheim's seeking to make democratic planning the principia media of society (Mannheim, 1940: 197-212) .
13. Periodic political influence is brought to bear upon planning issues at state level such as revision of the Good Design Guide for Medium Density Housing (now ResCode). However, the influence of these sporadic instances, often highly publicized, is small in comparison with the ongoing impact of the day to day processes.
14. 'Real' in the Habermasian sense refers to interests that actors truthfully hold, as opposed to positions held for strategic reasons.
15. The local sections of VPP planning schemes allow for the inclusion of local policy. However, limited scope is given for modification of the predetermined policies and statutory controls in the remainder of the planning scheme (zones, overlays, decision criteria, etc.). Additionally, the greater weight given to the remainder of the scheme and state policy renders local policy largely ineffective in determining outcomes, particularly in VCAT.
16. It must be noted that dramaturgical behaviours, such as citing conformance with urban consolidation policy, are common in this instance -notwithstanding developers' primary goal being financial gain.
17. The subsidiarity principle suggests that power should be exercised by the lowest level institution possible, unless convincing reasons as to why they should be allocated to a higher level jurisdiction are provided (CEPR, 1993) . Accordingly, efficiency concerns related to spillover effects or economies of scale are best dealt with by central powers, while the particularities of local conditions and preferences suggest efficiency in some matters is best achieved at local level. Some equity goals may be reached by allowing redistribution within localities, however, redistribution among localities would generally require the exercise of a more central power. Finally, accountability goals may sometimes be best achieved via a central overarching body, or alternatively, may require the scrutiny of local interests if effects of government policies are felt in a locally specific manner (CEPR, 1993 
